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NOTRE DAME LAWYER

agreement that they should adopt her, and rear, nurture and educate
her, and that she was to be as their own child, and at their death to
receive or be left all the property which they might own. She lived with
them until they died, some ten years afterward, took their name, did
not recognize or know her own father and mother in the true relation,
but knew them as, and called them uncle and aunt, and knew and
recognized her uncle and aunt as father and mother. The uncle and
aunt died possessed of real estate in the city of Omaha, the title to
which they did not, either by deed or will, transfer to the child. Held,
that there was such a part performance of the contract by the parties
thereto as entitled her to a decree giving her title to the property by
way of specific performance of the contract!' The child was never
legally adopted. In support of the conclusion reached, the Nebraska
court cited the following cases: Van Dyne v. Vreeland;2 Van Tine v.
Van Tine;3 Johnson v. Hubbell;4 Wight v. Wright; 5 Shahan v. Swan; 6
Sutton v. Hayden;7 Sharkey v. McDermott,8 from which last named
case, the court quoted: " 'An agreement by a man and his wife to adopt
a child, provide and care well for her, and leave her their property at
their death, performed on the part of the child, is enforceable as to
the property on their death'."
Since the decision in Kofka v. Rosicky the rule therein announced
has been followed by the Nebraska court in the following cases: Moline
v. Carlson;9 O'Connor v. Waters; 10 and Lacy v. Zeigler;1 and in
many other cases. Of course, the proof to establish such an oral agreement must be clear and convincing. The degree of proof is the main
point of difference in the decisions.
William M. Cain.
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FIFTY-SEVENTH GENERAL ASSE-M.BLY IN

ILLINOIS---PUBLIc

EN-

EM Es" AcT.-When the law-making body of Illinois convenes in its.

fifty-seventh general assembly this January at Springfield it will be confronted with the problem of legislating Illinois back to lawfulness. At
first blush, this appears to be a herculean task, but, when one considers that proposals clearly indicating the needed reform are awaiting
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the advent of Illinois' Solons at the Capitol, it loses some of its difficult
aspects. Substantial reform will be accomplished in Illinois if proposed
bills only survive the legislative axe.
For the past six months in Illinois, more particularly in Cook
County, there has been an unprecedented movement to improve both
its civil and criminal law. Allowing for the ordinary interest in reform
that the proximity of a legislative session stirs up, there remains a
degree of agitation for reform that is singular. What is, perhaps, most
significant about the present movement is that it- truly reflects the
dissatisfaction of the community with the codified law of Illinois.
From the volume of the appeal and the sources from which it
springs, the desire for reform seems to be quite universal. Various
committees have drawn up proposals for submission to the legislature
and, in order to insure their acceptance, have secured influential representatives to sponsor them in the Assembly. The Illinois and Cook
County Judicial Advisory Councils are pressing a plan to simplify criminal procedure. Members of the bench and bar graciously have lent
their legal sagacity to the movement and have aided materially by
drafting proposals in a manner consonant with constitutional law. By
their united efforts these committees, judges, and lawyers have made
the way to reform as clear as daylight.
Not every suggested bill merits the consideration of the legislators.
Some, of course, will be deservingly relegated to the scrap-heap. But,
for the most part, the measures having to do with reforming criminal law and procedure are worthy of consideration. Among the list
of suggested bills can be found proposals for repeal from the statute
books of noxious laws, and, on the other hand, there are proposals
which seek the passage of legislation to cover conditions which have
been shamefully neglected.
An example of the former type of proposal is the suggested bill
for repeal of Illinois' Prohibition and Search and Seizure laws. Last
November by more than a two to one majority the electorate of fllinois voted to repeal the Prohibition and Search and Seizure laws. The
removal of these laws from the statutes will not only accord with the
expressed desires of the people, but also will correctly reflect the antiVolstead sentiment of that state. No one will deny that such a proposal should be adopted by the legislature, and there are a host of
other bills ready for introduction which deserve similar action.
The other type of proposal referred to is that which seeks the passage of a law to cover conditions which are desperately in need of
regulation. There are many such proposals ready for presentation to
the legislature. One in particular warrants special mention. The
notoriously despicable crime situation existing in Chicago occasioned
its creation. The remedial effect it unmistakably will have justifies
its passage as an emergency measure.
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Reference is made to a proposed bill entitled, "An Act Against
Public Enemies." The bill was drafted by James G. Condon, once an
assistant state's attorney, and one who is well acquainted with the unsatisfactory condition of the Illinois criminal code. Passage of this act
would put a law on the Illinois statute books to which the class of
criminal recently stigmatized by the Chicago Crime Commission as
"public enemies" would be amenable.
The present criminal code of Illinois is all inclusive in its enumeration of crimes, yet gangsters, commonly known to be calloused
criminals, are daily flouting the law because they do not fall within
its condemnation. Although publicly known to be arch-criminals, it is
highly impractical to indict them since the evidence necessary to conviction cannot be adduced. Naturally enough the result is that these
"public enemies" are left to ply their unlawful trade, distressing the
people and discrediting the State of Illinois.
In Chicago an attempt has been made to supply this deficiency
of the code by Municipal Judge Lyle. His plan was to bring "public
enemies" within the definition of the vagrancy law in Illinois. This
law t as set out in the criminal code is, technically speaking, broad
enough to allow'prosecution of "public enemies," and in a few instances, notably James "Fur" Samm6ns case, the state was able to
secure conviction of this class of criminal under its terms.
The incongruity of prosecuting millionaire gangsters for vagrancy,
however, was too striking to render this legal fiction (and it was nothing more) effective. Denominating one a vagrant who on a minute's
notice could furnish, if necessary, a bail bond of one-hundred thousand
1 "All persons who are idle and dissolute, and who go about begging; all
persons who use any juggling or other unlawful games or plays; runaways;
pilferers; confidence men; common drunkards; common nightwalkers; lewd,
wanton, and lascivious persons in speech or behavior; common railers and brawlers; persons who are habitually neglectful of their employment or their calling,
and do not lawfully provide for the support of their families; and all persons
who are idle or dissolute and who neglect all lawful business, and who habitually
mis-spend their time by frequenting houses of ill-fame, gaming houses or tippling
shops; all persons lodging in, or found in the night-time in out-houses, sheds,
barns or unoccupied buildings or lodging in the open air, and not giving a good
account of themselves; and all persons who are known to be thieves, burglars or
pickpockets, either by their own confession or otherwise, or by having been convicted of larceny, burglary, or other crime against the laws of the State, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison, or in a house of correction of any city,
and having no lawful means of support, are habitually found prowling around any
steamboat landing, railroad depot, banking institution, broker's office, place of
public amusement, auction room, store, shop or crowded thoroughfare, car or
omnibus, or at any public gathering or assembly, or lounging about any courtroom, private house of ill-fame, gambling house, or tippling shop, shall be
deemed to be and they are declared to be vagabonds." Smith-Hurd Ill. Statute.a
Ch. 38, sec. 578.
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dollars seemed to the people of Illinois altogether absurd, and, however much it comported to the letter, manifestly is opposed to the spirit
of the vagrancy law. As a result conviction under the vagrancy statute
c.nly served to bring criticism upon the courts. Latterly, this attitude
of the people has been reflected in the verdicts of juries.impanelled
to hear vagrancy cases.
Moreover, a recent decision 2 of the Supreme Court of Illinois,
fixing five thousand dollars as a reasonable bail in vagrancy cases,
took more teeth out of the vagrancy statute, at least, as related to
"public enemies." Five thousand dollars, a paltry sum to even less
successful gangsters, was readily advanced by associates of "public
enemies" to put them at large. While a bail bond of one-hundred
thousand might secure the appearance of gangsters for trial, the amount
fixed by the Supreme Court of Illinois is wholly'inadequate for that
purpose. Few "public enemies" would give the forfeiture of five
thousand dollars a second thought.
It is to furnish a solution for the problem of preventing justice from
being thwarted by "public enemies," and to supply the deficiency of
the criminal code of Illinois that James G. Condon has drafted his
plan for presentation to the Assembly: That it will, if accepted by the
legislature, accomplish its purpose is undeniable. A cursory glance at
some of its provisions will remove any doubt as to its merit.
In substance the Act provides that any lawless and notorious character accustomed to live by rule of the gun shall be considered a
public menace by merely appearing in the street. To assure its being
upheld by the courts, however, a number of specific overt acts, such
as, intimidation of witnesses, perjury, bail jumping, etc., are set out in
the body of the Act. There is also an emergency clause attached to
the proposed bill which will make it effective as soon as it is signed
by the governor, provided, of course, that it is passed by the Legislature.
Under the provisions of the "Act Against Public Enemies," any
notorious gangster who is guilty of any of the specific overt acts set
out in its body, can be prosecuted for the crime of being a public
enemy. The legislature may fix as severe a penalty for the crime of
being a "public enemy" as it deems advisable. Under the .Vagrancy
statute the maximum penalty is imprisonment at hard labor for six
months, or a fine of one hundred dollars ($100.00).8 Further than
that, such a statute would not be governed by the ruling of the
People ex rel Sammons v. Snow, Bailiff, et al., 173 N. E. 8 (1930).
3 Smith-Hurd Ill. Statutes, Ch. 38, sec. 579.
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Supreme Court of the state in People ex rel Sammons v. Snow, 4 and,
therefore, a bail bond which would reasonably assure the appearance
of the accused could be fixed. In fine, it is a logical way of preventing
further thwarting of justice by the "public enemy." This type of law
deserves a niche in the statutes of every state in the Union. It would
unmistakably grace the criminal code of Illinois.
William Lee O'Malley.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION-INDIANA.-According to press reports, the
Indiana State Bar Association recognized the deplorable inadequacies
in the administration of justice in this state, and recommended two
remedies. One was that the judges should be elected without reference
to their political allegiance, and the other that the Supreme Court
should be empowered to adopt rules of procedure. Experience shows
that both these expedients have been futile. With a non-partisan
judiciary, it is well nigh impossible to rid the bench of barnacles; and,
though the Supreme Court be given plenary power to formulate rules
of procedure, it will not do so, finding it easier to fall in with the existing rules with which most of the bar is famiiar than to make new ones.
What the legislature could do is to abolish the intermediate Court of
Appeals, and provide for a Supreme Court Commission, appointing the
present judges of the Appellate Court to be members of such commission, and then require the judges to sit in divisions. Experience has
demonstrated the feasibility of that plan, and it can be put in operation
without any constitutional amendment.
William M. Cain.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION-NEBRASKA.-The Attorney General of Nebraska has announced that he has had bills drafted for introduction in
the legislature making certain changes in the crifminal procedure. These
bills contemplate the following:
To give the prosecution the right to comment upon the failure of
the defendant to testify in his own behalf.
To give the state an equal right with the defendant for a change
of venue.
To make bail bonds a lien upon the surety's property.
That pleas of insanity be determined by the court, after being
advised by experts of its own appointment as well as those presented
by the state or the defense.
That no minor can plead guilty to any criminal offense without
the advice of his parents or guardian.
It seems that the wisdom of some of these proposed changes may
be approved, and of others questioned. As to the first, likely the defendant's silence, in the face of the state's evidence, is a sufficient com4
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